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Abstract 
ICT is becoming a prominent part of healthcare delivery but brings with it information privacy 
concerns for patients and competing concerns by caregivers. A proper balance between these 
must be established in order to fully utilise ICT capabilities in healthcare. Information 
accountability is a fairly new concept to computer science which focuses on fair use of 
information. In this paper we investigate the different issues that need to be addressed when 
applying information accountability principles to manage healthcare information. We briefly 
introduce an information accountability framework for handling electronic health records 
(eHR). We focus more on digital rights management by considering data in eHRs as digital 
assets and how we can represent privacy policies and data usage policies as these are key 
factors in accountability systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is becoming a prominent part of 
healthcare delivery. But issues such as information security and privacy concerns have 
hindered its progression towards improving healthcare delivery.  The use of ICT in healthcare 
has given rise to a comparatively new informatics domain called e-health. Electronic health 
records (eHR) are the driving force behind e-health. An eHR is a complete record of a 
patient’s medical history which may include information pertaining to sensitive concerns such 
as sexual health, mental health, addictions to drug or alcohol, abortions etc. Due to this reason 
patients demand strong security for their eHRs. Without trusting that their sensitive health 
information will be safeguarded, patients are reticent to fully and honestly disclose their 
personal information and may avoid seeking care altogether (Goldman and Hudson 2000). 
Unlawful disclosure of personal information could cause the subject of the information 
embarrassment and may affect insurability, child custody cases, and even employment (Pratt, 
Unruh et al. 2006; Cannoy and Salam 2010). Therefore, informational privacy is vital to 
ensure the reliability of eHR systems. Alan Westin, in his book “Privacy and Freedom”, 
defines privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others” (Westin 
1967), i.e. control of private information. Others argue that data confidentiality addresses 
privacy requirements. Confidentiality means giving the information owner the control of the 
information whereas privacy deals with giving the subject of the information control over it. 
Data ownership is itself subject to disparity in different contexts. However, a significant 
degree of control over personal information is essential to protecting information privacy 
(Solove 2008). 
Access to sensitive information must be handled with rigor and vigilance. Various methods 
have been proposed to address the privacy conundrum ranging from strict access control to 
privacy-preserving algorithms such as anonymization (Bayardo and Agrawal 2005), 
generalization (Sweeney 2002), and perturbation (Kargupta, Datta et al. 2003). However, these 
techniques may discourage honest and legitimate users from accessing data required to fulfill 
genuine tasks. Access control mechanisms either permit or deny access, there are no 
intermediate states. They are not policy-aware and may also hinder the actions of legitimate 
users of an information system (Kagal and Pato 2010).  According to Kagal et al. (2010) 
access control mechanisms alone are inadequate for privacy protection.  
Information accountability (IA) complements access control mechanisms and supports policy-
awareness. In theory, the principles behind IA would make sure that the information users 
follow the appropriate rules and policies. To facilitate IA principles, systems should 
implement usage policies on its assets. Data in eHRs can be considered as digital assets. Data 
management in e-health thus entails digital rights management (DRM). Privacy policies in e-
health can be represented using an appropriate digital rights expression language (REL). 
Policies on the use of data in an eHR can be set by the patient, a trusted healthcare 
representative, a health authority or all the above.  
The contribution of this paper is an information accountability framework (IAF) for eHR 
systems and the structure of the policy representation in the framework. The IAF is built on IA 
principles which we will discuss in section 3. We will illustrate data usage policy 
representations for eHRs using the open digital rights language (ODRL) with the aid of a 
simple case scenario. 
 
 
2. Information Accountability 
A serious concern for accountability systems is the lack of formal foundations. Formalising 
information accountability has been widely explored by many in recent work (Lampson 2005; 
Weitzner, Abelson et al. 2008; Jagadeesan, Jeffrey et al. 2009; Sloan and Warner 2010; 
Feigenbaum, Hendler et al. 2011; Feigenbaum, Jaggard et al. 2011). Feigenbaum et al. (2011) 
claim that a purely preventive approach to security is inadequate, thus supporting the claim by 
Kagal et al. (2010). They investigate some existing frameworks for accountability and explore 
whether deterrence is a better term than accountability and puts forth a formal model for 
accountability in terms of punishment (Feigenbaum, Jaggard et al. 2011). Assuming that the 
relevant privacy policies exist, Jagadeesan et al. (2009) make an effort  to develop formal 
foundations for information accountability in terms of the privacy policies which define 
appropriate sharing of information among agents and provides algorithms that can be used by 
an auditor to check for compliance with rules. 
A solution to the question of compliance of privacy policies is proposed by Weitzner et al. 
(2008) by tracking all transactions and making them transparent. They assume that appropriate 
policy rules exist with a formal representation, policy-aware transaction logs and a policy-
reasoning capability which would enable accountability systems to hold information users 
(individuals and organisations) accountable for their actions. With a strong focus on the facts 
Weitzner et al. (2008) put forth, Sloan et al. (2010) address information accountability in 
broader scope by considering social policies and technical aspects. They point out that 
automated checking for compliance of privacy policy is a necessity for accountability systems 
and without the adequate foundations in both formal models and public policy issues they are 
unlikely to do so. They believe that policies required to developing accountability systems are 
informational norms and state that a proper balance between privacy requirements and 
competing concerns is necessary to sustain the architectural and social aspects introduced by 
Weitzner et al. (2008). 
Defining a general formula for IA with the current ambiguous nature of the concept is a 
difficult feat and would not directly benefit the development of accountability systems which 
is the ultimate goal. We believe that contextual definitions would be more suitable in that the 
characteristics of the policies, if not the proper policies themselves, can be developed. 
 
2.1. Principles of Information Accountability 
In computer science, access control and accountability are closely related. Access control is 
about restrictions, whereas accountability is about punishment. Therefore, audit logs are an 
essential part of an accountability system (Lampson 2009). In any information system all trust 
is within the system, outsiders cannot be held accountable. We cannot hold everyone 
accountable, it is crucial that we identify who can be held accountable and who cannot.  
Therefore, an accountability system should have strong system boundaries. Accountability 
systems facilitate fair use of information. Rather than prevention via rigid locks on data, 
accountability is about deterrence. The presence of an accountability mechanism deliver a 
threat of punishment which would deter users from intentional misuse. Accountability systems 
should facilitate transparency such that all relevant parties have the capability to observe how 
information is used and by whom. This makes bad acts visible and helps deter users from 
misuse. 
The users of an accountability system should be well informed, i.e. a notification process 
where users are informed about underlying policies before an action occurs must be put in 
place. For example a user will be notified whether he is authorised to access/use a particular 
set of data he is trying to access/use and the ramifications if he proceeds regardless of the 
warning. This will also help in facilitating non-repudiation which is a significant aspect in 
information security. All users of the system are kept informed of relevant transactions by the 
Message Engine and related services in the IAF below. 
When holding someone accountable, trustworthiness of the data about the inappropriate 
transaction(s) is important. Hence, provenance of data and metadata is a significant factor in 
information accountability. As Moreau et al (2008) point out, electronic data does not have the 
necessary historical information that would help end-users, reviewers or regulators make the 
necessary verifications. In an accountability system provenance can be facilitated using 
appropriate transaction logs (Policy aware Transaction Logs and Transaction Metadata 
Engine in Figure 1). These transaction logs also serve another purpose in terms of 
accountability by being policy-aware. Policy-aware transaction logs can also facilitate policy 
reasoning capabilities (facilitated by the Policy Reasoning Engine in Figure 1) and enable the 
users to reason about misuse and against claims of misuse. 
Creating proper incentives that would make consumers follow rules of accountability systems 
is important (Sloan and Warner 2010). For an information user, the threat of punishment for 
misuse is an incentive to follow system rules. An incentive such as a strong assurance of 
privacy should be given to patients to prevent them from withholding information or enforcing 
rigid restrictions on data which would be their obvious cause of action to secure their 
information. 
 
2.2. Information Accountability in Healthcare 
In order to understand the concept of information accountability in healthcare, it is important 
to clearly identify the different parties in healthcare that can be held accountable, the issues for 
which a party can be held accountable and the appropriate mechanisms for accountability in 
healthcare (Emanuel and Emanuel 1996). The National E-Health Transition Authority (2011) 
has identified several types of roles with different capabilities in their new Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR) system; individuals, nominated representatives, 
authorised representatives, providers and nominated providers. Policies should be developed 
that address the different capabilities of roles within the industry. These policies should 
capture the requirements of all relevant parties. In a healthcare domain it is difficult to define 
who owns health information. It is clear that patients are the subjects of health information. 
But patients are not always medical professionals; hence it is impossible to give them full 
control of their health information. Privacy policies should accompany an input from a 
professional health body such as a trusted medical practitioner or a central health authority. 
But it is important to balance between the patient’s privacy requirements and the requirements 
of the healthcare providers or the care givers (competing concerns). 
In a healthcare setting, the patient’s privacy policies cannot contradict those set by the 
healthcare providers or the health authority. The IMIA code of ethics for medical information 
professionals (International Medical Informatics Association 2002) states under their first 
ethics principle that “All persons have a fundamental right to privacy, and hence to control 
over the collection, storage, access, use, communication, manipulation and disposition of data 
about themselves”. Taking this to consideration let us devise the following general 
requirements of a patient with an eHR: 1) the capability to control access to the eHR by 
allowing only a preferred set of medical practitioners access to the eHR, 2) the capability to 
hide certain health information from health practitioners who already have access to their eHR, 
3) the capability to check how the eHR is manipulated by authorised users, 4) the capability to 
inquire about concerning usage. Let us also consider a the following requirements of 
healthcare practitioners: 1) the capability to define their security policies within the 
organization, 2) access to the relevant information in a non-restrictive and timely manner, 3) 
the capability to share patient health information with other health specialists, 4) the capability 
to override patients’ security settings in special circumstances (e.g. life threatening emergency 
situations, mental health related situations). We take these requirements in to consideration 
when designing our IAF for eHR systems. It is important to note that usage policy 
enforcement might not always be beneficial to the patient. While fulfilling these privacy 
requirements under no circumstance must the health of the patient is compromised. A 
compromise between the requirements must entail the final policy representation of the 
systems and the proper integration of these policies would improve patient confidence in the 
system. Clear procedures for overriding usage policies in emergency situations should be 
defined. The nature of the healthcare domain forces the implementation of a break the glass 
approach in emergency situations.  
Apart from the requirements stated above, certain circumstances might require some health 
conditions be kept hidden from the patients. For example this may be the case for patients 
suffering from severe mental health conditions where the knowledge of particular illnesses 
may aggravate existing health conditions. They may also be considered unfit to manage their 
eHRs. We acknowledge this eventuality but consider them as rare occurrences and do not 
integrate such capabilities in to the framework. However, in such cases the control over the 
patient’s eHR may be given to a custodian or a trusted health professional (HP) such as the 
patients GP who can take the patient’s role in controlling the eHR. 
 
 
3. Information Accountability Framework for EHR Systems 
Considering the information accountability principles and the contextual requirements of 
healthcare discussed above, we designed the information accountability framework (IAF) for 
e-health systems depicted in Figure 1. Due to space restrictions we shall only give a brief 
overview of the IAF in this paper. 
The core components of the IAF are the privacy-aware policy engine, the policy-aware 
transaction logs and the policy reasoning engine within the policy engine. The IAF has inputs 
from the patients, the health authority and health professionals who wish to access/use 
information. The policy aggregator engine will amalgamate the patient’s policies and the 
health authority’s policies. This amalgamation is done in such a way that the patient’s privacy 
requirements are met and the health authorities’ policies be satisfied. HPs are required to lodge 
a usage request before they are able to access the eHR data. If their requests are satisfactory 
they are provided with the requested data. Necessary notifications are sent to patients about the 
activities on their eHR data. The patients are able to lodge usage inquiry queries on certain 
episodes of information usage. The health professionals can answer those queries by lodging 
reasoning queries as to why they have done so. All queries made by the actors are policy 
aware. Hence the need for policy-aware transaction logs. 
 
 
Figure 1: Information Accountability Framework for eHRs 
 
 
We note here that NEHTA’s PCEHR (National E-Health Transition Authority 2011) system 
describe an audit mechanism to improve consumer confidence in disclosing information in the 
system. It provides the consumers the capability to investigate the use of information by care 
providers. Their real time audit system differs from what we propose in that it is not explicitly 
policy or privacy aware. The policy and privacy aware audit mechanism in our IAF will enable 
the consumers to be more independent and would help towards giving the patients more 
control of their health information. 
 
3.1. Digital Rights Management 
The advancement of ICT, especially the role of the Internet, has led to the need of proper 
protection of digital media such as music-files, video-files, etc. Digital contracts were 
developed to control the flow and use of information. These contracts were expressed using 
digital property rights languages. Such technologies are known as digital rights management 
(DRM). DRM technologies are well known for their role in copyright protection of media files 
on the Internet and are becoming a prominent resource in protecting private information of 
individuals (Feigenbaum, Freedman et al. 2002). DRM has many similarities to the traditional 
access control model but differs in that they require information to remain protected even after 
access is granted. DRM deals with usage control of information resources by authorised users. 
Each piece of information is protected by a usage license created by the digital rights holder. 
DRM can benefit e-health technologies by providing a means to manage the use and control of 
patient electronic health records. The patients and the health authority have the rights to 
manage the usage licenses which can be expressed in Rights Expression Languages (REL). 
RELs are a critical aspect of DRM systems. RELs such as XrML (ContentGuard 2011) and the 
Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL Initiative 2012) are prominent among others. 
The ODRL rights expression language provides a syntax and semantics to express policies 
related to digital assets. The ODRL core model is formally specified using UML notation and 
aims to be independent from implementation constraints and is able to express a wide range of 
policy-based information (ODRL Initiative 2012). In the next sections we will show how 
patient privacy policies and other eHR requirements can be represented in ODRL expressions. 
 
3.2. Healthcare Scenario 
Consider the following scenario. Gary has a comprehensive eHR. This eHR is formulated such 
that each type of data (e.g. identity data, general health data, dental health data, mental health 
data, etc.) can be distinguished by eHR data type identifiers. For each of these data types there 
exists a set of predefined purposes for which those data can be used. The purposes are defined 
by a central health authority considering all necessary requirements to address every episode 
of care. Gary has a list of trusted healthcare providers (health professionals) to whom he may 
give access to data in his eHR. Peter is Gary’s GP, Sandra is a dermatologist, Bill is a sexual 
health specialist and Matt is a mental health specialist who has treated Gary in the recent past. 
Gary can set privacy settings to govern the access to his eHR. A central health authority can 
also set access settings to patient’s eHR by considering the roles of each health professional.  
 
3.2.1. Scenario 
After noticing a skin rash, Gary visits his trusted dermatologist Sandra for a check up. After a 
preliminary examination, Sandra thinks that Gary’s skin condition could be linked to a known 
sexually transmitted disease (STD). Gary does not have a sexual health specialist in his list of 
trusted health professionals. However, Sandra wants to share Gary’s details with a sexual 
health specialist, Bill, in order to get a specialists opinion on the situation. Bill has a default 
access level set by the health authority to be able to access patients’ sexual health details and 
dermatology details. Since Sandra is in Gary’s list of trusted HPs to be able to access Gary’s 
dermatology information, she can initiate a request to share Gary’s details with other health 
professionals. Gary, however, is notified of this action by Sandra. After Bill gets this request, 
he initiates a usage request to use the data for diagnosis purposes. Gary has a history of mental 
illness and does not want anyone else other than his GP (Peter) and a trusted mental health 
specialist who treated him (Matt) to know about it. At some point during or after this episode 
of care, Gary may include Bill to his list of trusted health professional. 
 
3.2.2. Scenario with ODRL 
 
 
Figure 2: Settings for Sandra by Gary 
 
 
The ODRL XML Encoding for the UML in Figure 2 is as follows. 
 
<o:policy xmlns:o= "http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type="http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/privacy" 
uid="policy-use-ehr" conflict="o:prohibit"> 
<o:permission> 
<o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/> 
<o:party uid="urn:patient:gary" role="o:assigner"/> 
<o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:sandra" role="o:assignee"/> 
<o:action name="o:read"/> 
<o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="eh:healthCare"/> 
</o:permission> 
<o:prohibition> 
<o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/> 
<o:party uid="urn:patient:gary" role="o:assigner"/> 
<o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:sandra" role="o:assignee"/> 
<o:action name="o:read"/> 
<o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="eh:sexualHealthCare"/> 
<o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="eh:mentalHealthCare"/> 
</o:prohibition> 
</o:policy> 
 
In the privacy policy above, Gary gives Sandra permission to access his entire health record 
and prohibits her from accessing his sexual health and mental health details. The conflict 
attribute of the policy is set to “prohibit” indicating that prohibitions take precedence in the 
policy. Gary’s settings for other trusted HPs have the same structure while attribute values 
change accordingly.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Settings for Sandra by the health authority 
 
 
The ODRL XML Encoding for the UML in Figure 3 is as follows. 
 
<o:policy xmlns:o= "http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type=" 
http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/agreement" uid="policy-use-ehr"> 
 <o:permission> 
  <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/> 
  <o:party uid="urn:health:authority" role="o:assigner"/> 
  <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:sandra" role="o:assignee"/> 
<o:action name="o:read"/> 
  <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="eh:dermatHealthCare"> 
  <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="eh:sexualHealthCare"> 
 </o:permission> 
</o:policy> 
 
The health authority is responsible for setting default access policies for specific healthcare 
roles, in this case for the role of a dermatologist. In the policy in Figure 3 the health authority 
gives Sandra the permission to access Gary’s dermatology details and sexual health details. 
Note here that Gary’s settings prohibit Sandra from accessing his sexual health details. But we 
assume a hypothetical scenario where a relationship between skin conditions and STDs exist, 
and every dermatologist should have access to the patient’s sexual health details. The health 
authority is aware of this fact and allows all dermatologists access to patients sexual health 
details. The settings by the health authority always prevail over patient settings. The patient 
however will be given notice of this before any actions occur on the data. Similar relationships 
may be present in the medical field. Therefore, an input from an entity with the relevant 
medical knowledge is essential in the formulation of policies of this nature. The final policy 
will be a combination of the two policies and hence the requirement for a policy aggregation 
engine in our IAF. The patient is given due notice of this before any actions occur on the data. 
Any usage requests by Sandra are compared with this aggregated policy and if compatible, the 
requested usage licenses are issued. In the case of an incompatible usage request, the user is 
given notice as to why the license is not issued and the user can choose to comply with the 
existing policy or to override it. In such a situation the patient is notified about possible misuse 
of information. 
 
 
Figure 4: Request to share Gary’s data with Bill 
 
 
The ODRL XML Encoding for the UML in Figure 4 is as follows. 
 
<o:policy xmlns:o="http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type="http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/request" 
uid="policy-share-ehr"> 
<o:permission> 
 <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/> 
 <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:sandra" role="o:assignee"/> 
 <o:action name="o:share"/> 
 <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="eh:dermatHealthCare"> 
 <o:constraint name="o:recipient" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:bill"> 
 </o:permission> 
</o:policy> 
 
The policy in Figure 4 represents Sandra’s request to the eHR system to share Gary’s 
dermatology details with Bill. If Sandra is granted with the license for this policy she can 
initiate the sharing process. After the initiation, Bill will have access to the eHR Data stated in 
the policy but still has to request a usage license from the eHR system. This is given in Figure 
5. In this policy Bill requests a license to read Gary’s dermatology details for the purpose of a 
dermatology related episode of care (dermatHealthCare). 
 
 
Figure 5: Usage request by Bill 
 
 
The ODRL XML Encoding for the UML in Figure 5 is as follows. 
 
<o:policy xmlns:o= "http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type=" http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/request" 
uid="policy-use-ehr"> 
 <o:permission> 
  <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/> 
  <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:sexualHealth:bill" role="o:assignee"/> 
  <o:action name="o:read"/> 
  <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="eh:dermatHealthCare"> 
 </o:permission> 
</o:policy> 
 
Usage requests by users are compared with the predefined policies and if satisfied, the licenses 
are issued. In this case however, Bill’s usage request will be compared with the sharing 
request initiated by Sandra since Bill is not currently in the trusted list of health professionals. 
Using this policy representation we can clearly define patient privacy concerns and the 
requirements of the healthcare domain in terms of information access. Individual HPs can also 
implement their access requirements with the consent of the patients. With this representation 
we fulfill the first requirement for accountability systems. Policy-aware transaction logs, 
policy reasoning and the other components of the IAF can be developed over the existing 
policy platform. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
In this paper we have investigated information accountability and its application in healthcare. 
We identified several key aspects of IA via related literature. We presented an IAF for eHRs 
that would enable us to develop an accountability system for e-health. It is clear that IA is a 
new concept to computer science and the proper definition of its principles is still in its 
infancy. This is a significant barrier for systems developers to build systems that are IA 
compliant. We believe that it is suitable to define or rather formulate the foundations for 
accountability systems contextually. This would enable the system developers to gain a clearer 
insight of the requirements of the system. 
Privacy policy representation is a significant part of accountability systems. The arrangement 
of policies varies depending on the nature of the information being protected and the nature of 
the industry. For example, it is unclear as to who the actual owners of health information are. 
This led us to introduce a policy aggregator engine to our IAF to amalgamate privacy policies 
of the patients and the policies of a health authority. In a realistic scenario patients would be 
given control of their eHR at a suitable age put forward by a relevant authority.  
Being policy driven, the proper representation of the necessary policies is essential in 
accountability systems. As a first step towards implementing the proposed IAF, we used the 
open digital rights language for representing the various policies in the system. ODRL v2.0 is 
a work in progress release which gave us the flexibility to accommodate certain requirements 
of the healthcare domain. In order to implement the IAF a comprehensive set of attribute 
values need to be defined. We have presented a simple scenario to demonstrate the policy 
representations. Due to space restrictions we are unable to present a complete set of policy 
representations in this paper. 
A policy reasoning capability should be facilitated by an accountability system. This allows 
the users (e.g. patients) to investigate possible breaches of policy and the accused (e.g. health 
professionals) to defend their actions. But not all actions should be subject to such 
investigation which would disrupt activities of care givers. The system being policy-aware 
would identify possible breaches of policy and inform the relevant party giving them the 
opportunity to take action.  
 
 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
Accountability systems aim at keeping information safe from unnecessary disclosure and 
misuse by making bad acts visible to all concerned and deter users from misusing information 
by holding them accountable for misuse. Making this a reality is no easy feat. It involves the 
collaboration of experts from several disciplines including social science, law, computer 
science, and specialists form the domain for which the system is developed. The IAF presented 
in this paper follows IA principles in the healthcare context. We have explored a means of 
representing privacy policies in a machine readable manner which we intend to extend for 
policy reasoning, policy-aware audit logs and ultimately for determining policy compliance of 
information users. There is considerable amount of work to be done to make the IAF a 
comprehensive tool for the implementation of accountability systems. We are currently 
working on the implementation of this IAF to demonstrate its functionality in a simulated 
healthcare environment. We are working to extend the ODRL model to support policy 
reasoning to fulfill the requirements for accountability systems. 
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